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EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
by
Philip J. Pfeiffer*

and
W. Wendell Hall**

HE United States has a highly mobile workforce. With ever increasing frequency a seemingly infinite variety of companies conduct business and have employees in more than one state. In recognition of
these factors and the negative economic consequences that would prevail if
fundamental employment and labor law varied from state to state, the
United States has historically addressed labor law issues at the federal level
as part of a national labor policy.
Since the 1935 passage of the Wagner Act and the creation of the National
Labor Relations Board,' the Congress of the United States has addressed
major employment law issues on a nationwide scope. Fundamentally, the
wage and hour laws, 2 the civil rights statutes, 3 and employee safety standards 4 were all developed at the national level. When states have enacted
employment and labor laws, the statutes have been consistent with federal
pronouncements and have served to complement the national labor policy or
in some instances to fill in the gaps. 5
* B.S., Sam Houston State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Managing
Partner, Fulbright & Jaworski, San Antonio.
** B.A., The University of Texas; J.D., St. Mary's University. Participating Associate,
Fulbright & Jaworski, San Antonio.
1. Act of July 5, 1935, 49 Stat. 449, as reenacted by Act of June 23, 1947, 61 Stat. 136,
amended by Act of Sept. 14, 1959, 73 Stat. 519, amended by Act of July 26, 1974, 88 Stat. 395,
and last amended by Act of Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1972 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151168 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
2. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (Supp. V 1987).
3. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i; (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Civil Rights Act of 1866, 1870, and 1871, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985-1992, 1994-1996 (1982); Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
4. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
5. For example, the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 5221k (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1989), generally duplicates the provisions of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982), and was enacted in order
to provide Texas with deferral state status. The Texas Hazardous Substance Act, TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-13 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1989), is designed to complement standards developed under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
(1982). State wage (Texas Minimum Wage Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5159d
(Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1989)) and hour (TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5165-5165.4, 5165a,
5167a (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1989)) laws and legislative enactments addressing collective bar-

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43

The principle of a national labor policy has been advanced this past year
through enactments such as the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of
1988,6 the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 7 the executive order on Drug-Free
Workplace, 8 and the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act. 9
Despite the effort of the federal government to standardize employment and
labor law, state judiciaries continue to develop differing standards on such
issues as wrongful discharge claims 10 and the enforceability of noncompetition agreements.I
I.

THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE:

CONTINUING CHALLENGES

Although the Texas Legislature has enacted statutory exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine, 12 for the last one hundred and one years the
employment-at-will doctrine13 has remained intact with one narrow excep-

tion. The Texas Supreme Court in Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck 14 held
gaining issues (TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5154a (Vernon 1989 & Supp. 1989)) are
applicable only to those employees and employers not covered by the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 203, 206, 207, 211, 214, 215, 216 (Vernon Supp. III 1985 & Supp. IV
1986), and the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (Vernon 1982 & Supp. II
1985).
6. Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-347, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(102 Stat.) 646 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2002) (effective Dec. 27, 1988). The law
bars most polygraph tests for pre-employment screening (Id. § 3), but allows polygraph tests
to be administered to employees who are reasonably suspected of workplace theft or in connection with other incidents causing the employer economic loss (Id. § 7(d)). The law provides
exceptions for drug companies (Id. § 7(f)) and federal, state or local governments (Id. § 7(d))
and does not apply to testing administered for national defense or security reasons (Id. § 7(b)).
It permits pre-employment testing of security guards (Id. § 7(e)) and employees who will have
a direct access to controlled substances (Id. § 7(f)).
7. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (Jan. 21, 1989).
8. Executive Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987) (issued on Sept. 15, 1986), reprinted
in 5 U.S.C. § 730 (Supp. IV 1986).
9. Act of Aug. 4, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-379, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(102 Stat.) 890 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109) (Feb. 4, 1989). The law requires an
employer to give employees a sixty-day notice before ordering a permanent or temporary plant
closing or mass layoff (Id. § 3(a)) that is defined as a reduction of either at least 500 full-time
employees or at least 33% of the full-time employees affecting a minimum of 50 persons (Id.
§ 2(a)(3)). The law does not apply to a plant closing or mass layoff if either one constitutes a
strike, or a lockout, or if the employer is permanently replacing a person who is an "economic
striker" as defined in the National Labor Relations Act (Id. § 4(2)).
10. Employment at Will, 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (Individual Employment Rights
Manual) §§ 505:1-505:911 (1987 - 1989). As a result of the different treatment between the
states regarding wrongful discharge claims (Id. § 505:51), the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has prepared a Uniform Employment Termination Act
proposing a model wrongful discharge statute. 51 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) IERM 540:51.
11. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 616, 619-20 (July 13, 1988)
(noting the fundamental differences between Texas and Florida law regarding noncompetition
agreements).
12. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1989) (discharge for filing in
good faith a workers' compensation claim); Id. art. 5207a (Vernon 1987) (discharge based on
union membership or nonmembership); Id. art. 5221k, § 1.02 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1989)
(Texas Commission on Human Rights Act) (discharge based on race, color, handicap, religion,
national origin, age, or sex).
13. East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888). See Manning v. Upjohn Co., 862 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 1989) (Texas courts have not been hesitant to
declare that the employment-at-will doctrine is alive and well in Texas).
14. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
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that public policy, as expressed in the laws of Texas and the United States
that carry criminal penalties, requires the creation of an exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine when an employee has been discharged for refusing to perform a criminally illegal act ordered by his employer. 15 Despite
long-term adherence to the at will rule, challenges to the doctrine continue.
In some instances the courts have invited further challenges. 16 The substantive attacks on the employment-at-will doctrine include novel constitutional,
statutory, and common law claims arising from a change in the terms and
conditions of employment or the termination of the employment relationship. The dramatic increase in wrongful discharge litigation may be a reflection of the depressed economy that has tightened the job market in Texas or
the large jury verdicts awarded under various tort theories. 17 Regardless of
the reason, this trend toward litigation should alert employers in Texas that
novel and creative challenges to the employment-at-will doctrine are likely
to continue.
A.

Common Law Claims

1. Employment Agreements and the Employment-at- Will Doctrine
When the term of employment is left to the discretion of either party, or it
is left indefinite or determinable by either party, then either party may terminate the contract at will and without cause. 18 An employment-at-will relationship, absent a specific contract term to the contrary, may be terminated
at any time by either the employer or employee, for any reason or no reason,
with or without cause, and without liability for failure to continue employ15. Id. at 735; see Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1171 n.16 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Sab-

ine Pilot can be reasonably read as restricted to instances where the violations of law the employee refused to commit 'carry criminal penalties' ").
16. In Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d at 735, Justice Kilgarlin, joined by
Justice Ray, wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the at will doctrine "belongs
in a museum, not in our law." Justice Kilgarlin was defeated in his bid for re-election to the
supreme court in the November 8, 1988, general election. In Little v. Bryce, 733 S.W.2d 937
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ), a case not even involving the at will doctrine,
Justice Levy wrote a lengthy concurring opinion in which he strongly attacked the at will
doctrine as a "tenacious vestige from the industrial revolution and laissez-faire economics."
Id. at 939. Because of the unnecessary attack on the at-will doctrine, the majority opinion
expressly disassociated themselves from the views expressed by Justice Levy. Id. Subsequently, in two dissenting opinions, Justice Levy reiterated his view that the employment-atwill doctrine should be repudiated in its entirety. Lumpkin v. H & C Communications, Inc.,
755 S.W.2d 538, 540-41 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ requested); Dech v.
Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall, 748 S.W.2d 501, 505 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1988, no writ). Justice Levy was defeated in his bid for re-election to the First Court of
Appeals in the November 8, 1988, general election.
17. It has been estimated that, in the late 1970s, less than 200 wrongful discharge cases
were filed annually against private-sector employees. A. WESTIN & A. FELIV, RESOLVING
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES WITHOUT LITIGATION at 2 (1988). It is estimated that more than
20,000 wrongful discharge cases are now pending in state courts. Id. A recent study of wrongful discharge cases in California found employees winning 78 percent of the jury verdicts, with
punitive damages being awarded in 40 percent of the cases. Id. The average damages award in
these cases was $424,527. Id.
18. East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888); see also
Pfeiffer & Hall, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw. L.J. 97, 9899 nn.8 & 9 (1988).
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ment.19 During the last several years, however, wrongful discharge litigation based on the violation of a written or oral employment agreement has
proliferated. Written or oral employment agreements may indeed modify
the at will rule and require that the employer have good cause for the discharge of an employee.
a.

Written Modifications of the At Will Doctrine

In order to avoid the employment-at-will doctrine and establish a cause of
action for wrongful termination based on a written contract, an employee
must prove that he and his employer had a contract that specifically prohibited the employer from terminating the employee's service at will. 20 The
writing must provide in "a meaningful and special way" that the employer
does not have the right to terminate the employment relationship at will. 2 1
Employment is therefore at will absent a writing that specifically states
otherwise. 22 The requirement of a written contract arises from the requirement of the statute of frauds that "to be enforceable 'an agreement which is
not to be performed within one year from the date of the making' must be in
writing.

' '23

In several instances employees have attempted to avoid the employmentat-will doctrine by contending that the employee handbook or manual constituted a contractual modification of the at will rule. 24 The Texas courts,
however, have adhered to the general rule that employee handbooks, which
are not accompanied by an express agreement mandating specific procedures
for discharge of employees, do not constitute written employment agreements. 25 Employees are, thus, still subject to the employment-at-will
19. East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. at 75, 10 S.W. at 102; cf. Sabine Pilot Serv.,
Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d at 735 (court held that an at-will employee may not be terminated
for refusing to commit an illegal act and noted statutory limitations on the employment-at-will
doctrine).
20. Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1988, no writ); Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App.Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Webber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
21. McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1988), writ granted, 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.227 (Feb. 22, 1989) (quoting Benoit v. Polysar
Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 in S.W.2d at 406 (emphasis, original)); Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc.,
750 S.W.2d at 846; Webber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d at 127.
22. Webber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d at 127.
23. Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d at 846 (quoting TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(6) (Vernon 1987)).

24. Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co., 684 F. Supp. 152, 156 (E.D. Tex. 1987); Valdez v.
Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 596, 622 (W.D. Tex. 1988); Salazar v. Amigos Del
Valle, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ); Stiver v. Texas
Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d at 846; see also Lowry, The Vestiges of the Texas EmploymentAt-Will Doctrine in the Wake of Progressive Law: The Employment Handbook Exception, 18
ST. MARY'S L.J. 327 (1986) (application of the principles of consideration and mutuality to
employment handbooks).
25. Manning v. Upjohn Co., 862 F.2d 545, 547 n.2 (5th Cir. 1989); Joachim v. AT & T
Information Sys., 793 F.2d 113, 114 (5th Cir. 1986); Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co., 684 F.
Supp. at 156; Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. at 622; Salazar v. Amigos
Del Valle, Inc., 754 S.W.2d at 413; Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d at 846;
Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d at 407; Webber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720
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doctrine.
In Salazar v. Amigos Del Valle, Inc. 26 the plaintiffs contended that the
policies and procedures manual impliedly guaranteed that no employee
would be discharged except for good cause, and that the employer would
follow proper notice and grievance procedures before discharge. 27 The court
concluded, however, that the employment handbook was not a legally binding agreement. 28 Absent other evidence of a contract, the plaintiffs were
legally at will employees. 29 In Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc.30 the plaintiff alleged that the personnel manual contractually precluded employment
termination except for good cause and in accordance with specified disciplinary procedures. 31 The court disagreed and held that "employee handbooks, employee benefit booklets and similar documents [are] insufficient
written memoranda of a contractual employment agreement limiting the employer's right to discharge an employee at will to satisfy the requirements of
the Statute of Frauds."'32 Furthermore, the court also found that the only
written contractual agreement between the parties acknowledged the em33
ployer's option to terminate at will the employee's services.
In McClendon v. Ingersoll-RandCo. 34 the plaintiff argued that his written
compensation arrangement protected him from termination at will. 35 The
court observed, however, that the document merely stated company policy
regarding sales commissions. 36 Furthermore, the document's discharge provisions clearly permitted termination without any limitations as evidenced
by the specification that the "agreement is subject to change, at any time, by
'37
the Company without prior written notice."
An employer's letter to an employee regarding his position or salary may
also provide a basis upon which the employee may argue that there is a
39
written employment contract. 38 In W. Pat Crow Forgings Co. v. Casarez
S.W.2d at 128; Berry v. Doctor's Health Facilities, 715 S.W.2d 60, 61 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1986, no writ); Totman v. Control Data Corp., 707 S.W.2d 739, 744 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1986, no writ); Vallone v. Agip Petroleum Co., Inc., 705 S.W.2d 757, 758 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.) 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Molder v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 665 S.W.2d 175,

177 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza,
644 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ). Contra Aiello v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 818 F.2d 1196, 1198 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones, J., dissenting). The incongruity between Aiello and Joachim, which Judge Jones highlighted, and an analysis of Texas cases,
establishes that Aiello is an aberration and not a correct interpretation of Texas cases.
26. 754 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).

27. Id. at 413.
28. Id. at 413-14.
29. Id.
30. 750 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
31. Id. at 846.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 845-46.
34. 757 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988), writ granted, 32 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 227, 227-28 (Feb. 22, 1989).
35. Id. at 818.

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See W. Pat Crow Forgings, Inc. v. Casarez, 749 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1988, writ denied); Dech v. Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall, 748 S.W.2d 501,
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the employer sent to the employee a letter in which the parties agreed that
the employee would be promoted from hammer operator to forge shop supervisor, and that if the employee did not perform satisfactorily in the higher

position, he could resume his employment as a hammer operator. 4 0 The
court found that the letter was a specific contract term that protected the
41
employee from at will termination.

In Dech v. Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhal142 Dech orally accepted

an offer of employment as an architect with the Daniel firm. Dech's followup letter to the Daniel firm reiterated his acceptance and requested written
confirmation of the agreed upon terms of his employment, including his first
year salary. The Daniel firm then sent a confirmation letter to Dech. 43 After working for approximately twenty weeks, Dech was terminated due to a

diminished demand for architectural services. Subsequently, Dech sued the
Daniel firm alleging that the firm's letter constituted an employment contract for one year, and that the firm breached the contract. The trial court
allowed the jury to determine the intentions of the parties as to the duration
of the contract because the parties disagreed about the nature of their origi45
nal agreement. 44 The jury found that there was no contract.
The court of appeals affirmed. The court observed that the pivotal question was "when the contract was consummated."' 46 Dech argued that the
Daniel firm's confirmation letter was the entire contract. 4 7 The court held
503 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ); see also Molnar v. Engels, Inc., 705
S.W.2d 224, 225 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (demand for annual salary
indicates plaintiff assumed his employment agreement was for one-year term); Watts v. Saint
Mary's Hall, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (letter
stating the salary and length of employment equated to contract for term); Culkin v.NeimanMarcus Co., 354 S.W.2d 397, 400-01 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1962, writ ref'd) (letter
presented jury question as to terms of employment); Dallas Hotel Co. v. Lackey, 203 S.W.2d
557, 562 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (letter contemplating at least one year
of employment together with plaintiff's detrimental reliance on contents of letter presented
jury question); Dallas Hotel Co. v. McCue, 25 S.W.2d 902, 905-06 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1930, no writ) (without specified period of service, the determination is fact sensitive). In
Sornson v. Ingram Petroleum Servs., Inc., No. H-86-3923 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 1987), the plaintiff was offered employment in a letter stating that he would be paid "at a rate of $58,000 per
year." After nine months of employment, the plaintiff was discharged and he sued for breach
of contract. The court stated that the sole issue was whether, under Texas law, an offer of
employment promising compensation and an annual rate creates, upon acceptance, an employment contract for a one-year term, or whether such language merely establishes a rate of pay
under a contract of unlimited duration. The court held that despite promising an annual salary, the contract was of unlimited duration and therefore terminable at will.
39. 749 S.W.2d at 192.
40. Id. at 194.
41. Id.
42. 748 S.W.2d at 501.
43. Id. at 502 ("[tlhis letter is meant to confirm your acceptance of a position as staff
architect in our Houston based offices. Your salary will be $28,000 per annum in this position.
We expect to see you the first part of May.").
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 503.
47. Id. The court found Dech's argument unpersuasive because he also claimed that the
contract "included an agreement to cover his moving expenses and other expenses" despite the
absence of any reference to those items in the letter from the Daniel firm. Id.
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that sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that the employment
agreement was reached at Dech's interview with the Daniel firm, thereby
48
defeating his written contract claim.
b.

Oral Modifications of the At Will Doctrine

Each time an employer hires an employee, the two enter into a contract of
employment. Most employers and employees simply agree orally as to the
terms and conditions of the employment. Oral employment contracts may
also defeat an employer's right to terminate an employee at will.
In two cases employees have successfully avoided the employment-at-will
doctrine by alleging that their oral agreements with their employers provided that they would not be discharged except for good cause. 49 In Johnson
v. Ford Motor Co. 50 the court concluded that an employee may avoid the at
will rule when a supervisor with appropriate authority enters into an oral
agreement with the employee that he will be terminated only for good
cause.5 1 In Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co. 52 the court reversed a summary
judgment in favor of an employer because a fact issue existed as to whether
or not an oral or written employment agreement provided that the employee
53
would be discharged only for good cause.
An employee may also allege that the employer's oral assurance of employment for a specified period of time (greater than one year) creates an
enforceable contract of employment. Normally, the employer will counter
the argument that the oral agreement modifies the employment relationship
by alleging that the agreement violates the statute of frauds, which provides
that an oral agreement not to be performed within one year from the date of
its making is unenforceable. 54 The duration of the oral agreement determines whether the statute of frauds renders the agreement invalid. 55 Generally, the statute of frauds nullifies only contracts that must last longer than
one year. 56 The success of the employee's claim depends largely on the nature of the employer's assurance.
If, for example, an employer orally promises a thirty-three year old em48. Id. at 502-03. The court distinguished its case from Culkin v. Neiman-Marcus Co.,
354 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1962, writ ref'd) and Dallas Hotel Co. v.
Lackey, 203 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e) because they both
involved a written instrument construed as the contract. 748 S.W.2d at 502-03. Further, in
Dallas Hotel Co. v. McCue, 25 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1930, no writ) the court,
as in Dech, presented to the jury the fact issue of the duration of the contract. Id. The jury in
McCue, however, unlike the jury in Dech, found that there was an enforceable contract. 25
S.W.2d at 906.
49. Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ);
Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
50. 690 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 93.
711 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
Id. at 336-37.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. art. 26.01(a)(6) (Vernon 1987); see Morgan v. Jack

Brown Cleaners, Inc., 764 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, writ requested).

55. See 764 S.W.2d at 827.
56. Id. (citing Niday v. Niday, 643 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982)).
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ployment until normal retirement age, the contract is unenforceable because
a contract of employment until normal retirement age could not possibly be
performed within one year from the date the agreement is consummated.5 7
Judicial decisions are split on the issue of the applicability of the statute of
frauds to a promise of lifetime employment. Some cases hold that the promise of lifetime employment or permanent employment is the type of agreement that must be written to be enforceable. 58 Other cases hold that a
promise of lifetime employment does not need to be in writing because the
employee could conceivably die within a year of the making of the oral contract.5 9 If an employer assures an employee that he will have "job protection," then the employer may have created an enforceable oral employment
contract. 6° Basically, if the contract of employment is for an indefinite period of time, and it is considered performable within one year, then the contract does not violate the statute of frauds and is enforceable. 61
In Roberts v. Geosource Drilling Services, Inc. 62 Roberts, an oil drilling
worker, resigned from his current job in reliance on Geosource's promise of
employment abroad. Several days later, Geosource informed Roberts that it
would not employ him because the company had found someone better qualified. Among other issues Roberts sued for detrimental reliance on oral and
written representations under the theory of promissory estoppel. 63 Geosource moved for and was granted summary judgment on the basis that the
written contract was for employment at will. 64 The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment in favor of Geosource and held that Roberts
57. Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc. 750 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1988, no writ); Molder v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 665 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hurt v. Standard Oil Co., 444 S.W.2d 342, 344
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969, no writ) (promise of employment must be in writing).
58. Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(promise of lifetime employment, permanent employment or employment until the age of 65 must be in writing); Webber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d 124,
128 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (promise of lifetime employment
must be in writing).
59. Chevalier v. Lane's, Inc., 147 Tex. 106, 110-11, 213 S.W.2d 530, 532 (1948) (statute of
frauds does not apply to a promise of lifetime employment); Central Nat'l Bank v. Cox, 96
S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1936, no writ) (promise of employment until death
or incapacitation held enforceable because it could have been performed within one year;
therefore, promise not covered by the statute of frauds); see also Gilliam v. Kouchoucos, 161
Tex. 299, 301, 340 S.W.2d 27, 27-28 (1960) (oral contract of employment for ten years not
excluded from statute of frauds limitations by provision that it would terminate upon death of
employee).
60. Morgan v. Jack Brown Cleaners, Inc., 764 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988,
writ requested).
61. Miller v. Riata Cadillac Co., 517 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1974); Bratcher v. Dozier,
162 Tex. 319, 321-22, 346 S.W.2d 795, 796-97 (1961); Wright v. Donaubauer, 137 Tex. 473,
477, 154 S.W.2d 637, 639 (1941); See Morgan v. Jack Brown Cleaners, Inc., 764 S.W.2d at
827; Kelley v. Apache Prods., Inc., 709 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
62. 757 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
63. Id. at 50. The court set forth the elements of promissory estoppel: "(I) a promise, (2)
the promisor's forseeability of the promisee's reliance thereon, and (3) substantial reliance by
the promisee to his detriment." Id. (citing English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex.
1983)).
64. Id.
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had met the elements of promissory estoppel. The court concluded that Geosource promised employment; Geosource anticipated that Roberts would
rely on the promise; and Roberts subsequently left his current job to prepare
for an overseas position, causing him monetary and other personal harm. 65
The court stated that Geosource's oral promise clearly imposed a duty on
Geosource to employ Roberts, albeit not for a definite period, and that Geosource had not fulfilled its obligation. 66 The court concluded that the employment-at-will contract was no defense "where the employer foreseeably
and intentionally induce[d] the prospective employee [Roberts] to materially
change his position to his expense and detriment, and then repudiate[d] its
' '67
obligations before the written contract beg[an] to operate.
2. Implied Duty of Good Faith and FairDealing
In Aranda v. Insurance Co. of North America 68 the Texas Supreme Court
seemed to suggest that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
accompanied all contracts. 69 However, two courts of appeals and two federal district courts interpreting Texas law rejected the claim that a covenant
of good faith and fair dealing should be implied in ordinary employment
contracts. 70 The Texas Supreme Court recently, however, granted a writ of
error to determine whether the covenant of good faith and fair dealing ap71
plies in all employment contracts.
In McClendon v. Ingersoll-RandCo. 72 the plaintiff had worked for his employer as a commissioned salesman for almost ten years. McClendon ar65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. The court seemed to suggest that if Geosource had employed Roberts and then

terminated him one day after the effective date of the written at will employment contract,
then Geosource could have avoided liability based on the theory of promissory estoppel. See

id.
68. 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1988).
69. Id. at 212 (emphasis added).
70. McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d 816, 819-20 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1988) (Levy, J., dissenting), writ granted, 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 227, 227-28 (Feb. 22,
1989); Lumpkin v. H & C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1988) (Levy, J., dissenting), writ requested, 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 13 (Oct. 15, 1988));
see Grant v. Ford Aerospace & Communications Corp., No. H-86-4238 (S.D. Tex. May 16,

1988) (employer's good faith in terminating employee is only relevant when employment contract so provides or employee is assured that his employment will continue as long as employer

is satisfied with employee's performance); Robins v. Systems Dev. Corp., No. H-87-307 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 24, 1988) (implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inapplicable to at will
employment relationship); cf. Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 843, 846-47 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ) (employee waived cause of action for breach of

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Salinas v. Fort Hood Nat'l Bank, No. 03-87224-CV (Tex. App.-Austin June 15, 1988) (unpublished) (summary judgment upheld in favor

of employer rejecting employee's claim for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing).
71. McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d at 819 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1988), writ granted, 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 227, 227-28 (Feb. 22, 1989). The supreme

court's decision in McClendon will probably be dispositive of Lumpkin v. H & C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ requested) since the

only issue in Lumpkin at the court of appeals was whether an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is inherent in the employer-employee relationship.
72. 757 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988), writ granted, 32 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 227, 227.28 (Feb. 22, 1989).
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gued that his written compensation agreement barred the application of the
employment-at-will doctrine. 73 The employer, however, convinced the trial
court that the written compensation agreement merely stated company policy regarding sales commissions.7 4 The court of appeals agreed with the trial
court.

75

McClendon also urged the court of appeals to create an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing in the employer-employee relationship. 76 The
court observed that in English v. Fischer77 the Texas Supreme Court expressly rejected the routine application of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing to all contracts. 78 McClendon argued, however, that the
supreme court's decision in Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,7 9 which imposed the duty of good faith and fair dealing in insurance contracts, implicitly overruled English.8 0 The court rejected the
argument because its adoption would be tantamount to requiring good faith
and fair dealing clauses in all commercial contracts.8 1 The court noted that
the Arnold court imposed the duty as special protection for the insurance
relationship.8 2 The court also observed that the supreme court had ex'8 3
pressly disapproved "encumbrances on free movement in the workplace."
Accordingly, the court stated that "[a]n employee is as free to leave the relationship as an employer in a competitive environment: 'it is but a normal
effect of a free market economy.' "84
Finally, the McClendon court acknowledged that absent legislation restricting the right of an employer to dissolve an employment contract, it
would be "impertinent for [the court] to abrogate to [itself] the right to pass
additional laws under the guise of deciding cases."'8 5 The court noted that in
our system of constitutional government, the legislature establishes the policy of the state "although legislative processes may be imperfect, appeals for
judicial legislation based
on legislative inaction betray a loss of faith in dem86
ocratic government."
In Lumpkin v. H-&-C Communications, Inc.87 Lumpkin's sole point of
73. 757 S.W.2d at 817.

74. Id. For a discussion of McClendon's argument for breach of contract, see supra notes
34-37 and accompanying text.

75. 757 S.W.2d at 817.
76. Id.
77. 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983).
78. McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d at 819 (citing English v. Fischer, 660
S.W.2d at 522).
79. 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987).

80. McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d at 819-20.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 820 (citing Bergman v. Norris of Houston, 734 S.W.2d 673, 674 (Tex. 1987);
Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168, 172 (Tex. 1987)).
84. Id. (quoting Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d at 172, and citing TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 26).
85. Id. (citing TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1).
86. Id. (quoting Watson v. Zep Mfg. Co., 582 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
87. 755 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ requested).
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error on appeal was whether an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is inherent in the employer-employee relationship.8 8 In Lumpkin plaintiff had worked for defendant radio station for almost seventeen years.
89
Lumpkin alleged that he was fired without notice and without good cause.
Lumpkin admitted though that his employment was not for a fixed term,
and that his at-will-employment relationship was not contractually modified.
The defendant moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the
motion. 90 The court of appeals rejected Lumpkin's argument. 9 1 As an intermediate appellate court it was duty-bound to follow the law as expressed
by the supreme court and to leave changes in the application of the common
law to that court. 92 Thus, by exercising appropriate judicial self-restraint,
93
the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision.
3.

Related Tort Claims and Tortious Interference with Contract

Employees also advance various tort theories, including tortious interference with contract, in an effort to nullify and avoid the impact of the employment-at-will doctrine. In Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co. 94 Abston, in a
pendent state claim to his Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim,
alleged that his discriminatory firing intentionally or negligently caused him
severe emotional distress. 95 Levi Strauss argued that discharge from employment does not rise to the level of "outrageous conduct" required by law
for the tort of infliction of emotional distress. 96 The federal district court
rejected Levi Strauss' argument and held that the tort may be supported by
97
the circumstances surrounding the termination of an employee's services.
In response to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the court
concluded that the employer's acts were not typical of the "heinous" conduct found in cases of intentional infliction of emotional distress; therefore, it
was dismissed. 98 In response to the negligent infliction of emotional distress
claim, the court observed that outrageous conduct is not an element of the
88. Id. at 539.
89. Id.

90. Id.
91. Id. at 539-40.
92. Id. at 540.
93. Id.
94. 684 F. Supp. 152 (E.D. Tex. 1987).

95. Id. at 157.

96. Id.
97. Id. The court observed:

The tort [of infliction of emotional distress] is an established one, with a life of
its own, applying to an infinite variety of conduct not limited to discharge or
even to the employment context. An at-will employee should not be required to
suffer the consequences of conduct that would be considered tortious in any
other context, merely because it is coming from an employer. Indeed, the relationship between an employer and an at-will employee is one in which the employee is particularly vulnerable-a factor considered by some courts in finding
the employer liable for outrageous conduct.
Id. (citing 3 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, § 119.20, at 26-64 (1987 ed.)).

98. Id.
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cause of action. 99 Because Abston testified that "his termination caused him
to feel anger, depression, embarrassment, distress and shock," the court concluded that he had alleged sufficient facts to allow the jury to determine
whether the emotional distress supposedly suffered by Abston merited
compensation. oo
In McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.10 the court of appeals affirmed a
summary judgment granted in favor of an employer based on the former
employee's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.1 0 2 The court
found that the evidence established that McClendon's discharge, after almost 10 years of service, was neither extreme nor outrageous. 0 3 IngersollRand discharged McClendon in a reduction of its sales force necessitated by
unfavorable economic conditions.'°4
The court concluded that "[s]uch con'0 5
duct is in no way actionable."'
In Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co. 106 the Texas Supreme Court held that an
employee can maintain a cause of action for tortious interference with a contract10 7 when employment is terminable at will.108 Before the present case,
Sterner won a lawsuit against Marathon Oil in which he recovered damages
for injuries caused by gas inhalation. Thereafter, Sterner went to work for
99. Id. (citing Saint Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 652-53 (Tex. 1987)).
100. Id. at 157-58; cf. Salinas v. Fort Hood Nat'l Bank, No. 03-87-224-CV (Tex. App.Austin, June 15, 1988) (unpublished) (summary judgment upheld in favor of employer denying

plaintiff's claim for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress).
101. 757 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988), writ granted, 32 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 227, 227-28 (Feb. 22, 1989).
102. 757 S.W.2d at 820. Contra Spillman v. Simkins, 757 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Tex. App.San Antonio 1988, no writ) (in a wrongful discharge case, trial court erroneously struck plaintiff's allegation for intentional infliction of mental pain and anguish due to her employer's
"verbal abuse, denigration of Plaintiff's personal worth, and deliberately developing Plaintiff's
total economic isolation and consequential dependence upon Defendant's whim").
103. McClendon v. Ingersol-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d at 820.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 266 (Mar. 8, 1989). The supreme court's decision should also
resolve any conflict that may exist between two court of appeals decisions. In Salazar v.
Amigos Del Valle, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ), the court
held that "a third party's efforts to induce another to dissolve a contract at-will does not
constitute tortious interference with contract .... Id. at 414 (quoting C.E. Serv., Inc. v.
Control Data Corp., 759 F.2d 1241, 1248 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1037 (1985)).
In Champion v. Wright, 740 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, writ denied), however, the court held that a contract terminable at-will may be subject to a claim for tortious
interference. Id. at 854 (citing Deauville Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 756 F.2d 1183,
1195 (5th Cir. 1985). The Fifth Circuit has noted, however, that its decisions do not conflict.
C.E. Serv., Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 759 F.2d 1241, 1249 n.l I (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1037 (1985). The Fifth Circuit noted that its decision in Deauville Corp. holds that
Texas law supports a claim for tortious interference in an at will contract where a third party
has induced the breach without any economic justification, while CE. Serv., Inc. holds that
Texas law will not support a claim for tortious interference with an at will contract where
there is economic justification. Id.
107. The essential elements of a claim for tortious interference with contract are: (1) a
contract existing that was subject to interference (2) the act of interference was willful and
malicious; (3) such intentional act was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages; and (4)
actual damages or loss occurred. Champion v. Wright, 740 S.W.2d at 854-56. The plaintiff
must show that the defendant maliciously interfered with the contractual relationship without
legal justification or excuse. Sakowitz, Inc. v. Steck, 669 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. 1984).
108. Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 266-67.
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Ford, Davis, and Bacon, contractors who were performing work at a Marathon Oil facility. A Marathon Oil employee recognized Sterner, and the
next day Ford, Bacon, and Davis followed Marathon's order to terminate
Sterner's at will employment. Sterner then sued Marathon Oil for tortious
interference with his employment contract with Ford, Bacon, and Davis. 10 9
Marathon Oil complained on appeal that no cause of action exists for tortious interference with contract when employment is terminable at will." 10
The supreme court disagreed and observed that "the unenforceability of a
contract is no defense to an action for tortious interference with its performance."' 1 1 The court noted that until the at will contract is terminated it is a2
valid contract that third persons are not free to tortiously interfere with. 1
The court also concluded that whether legal justification or excuse exists for
interference with a contract is an affirmative defense and not an element of
the plaintiff's right of recovery. 113
B.
1.

Constitutionaland Statutory Claims

Claims Under the Texas Constitution

In Texas plaintiffs continue to rely upon the Texas Constitution to support
their causes of action where statutes or the common law do not provide a
cause of action or are too restrictive. The employer-employee relationship
has increasingly become the subject of constitutional claims.
In Cedillo v. Ewlin Enterprises,Inc.' 14 two female employees sued their
employer alleging, inter alia, sexual discrimination in violation of the Equal
Rights Amendment to the Texas Constitution.' 15 The Equal Rights
Amendment guarantees "[e]quality under the law. .... -116 The trial court
rejected the employees' claim and held that the Texas Constitution does not
redress alleged human rights violations by aprivate employer except through
the Commission on Human Rights Act.' 17 On appeal, the employees argued that the Equal Rights Amendment prohibits sexual discrimination by a
private employer. 1 8

The Cedillo court of appeals focused on the language in the Equal Rights
109. Id. at 266. In Robins v. Systems Dev. Corp., No. H-87-307 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 1988),
a wrongful discharge case, the court rejected a plaintiff's tortious interference with contract
claim noting that an employer cannot interfere with its own contract.
110. Id. at 267.
111. Id. (citing Clements v. Withers, 437 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tex. 1969)).
112. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 comment g (1979)).
113. Id. The court overruled Sakowitz, Inc. v. Steck, 669 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1984); Black
Lake Pipe Line Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1976); Rural Dev. Inc. v.
Stone, 700 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); and Terry v.
Zachry, 272 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e) to the extent the
decisions conflict with Sterner. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 267-68.
114. 744 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied).
115. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a ("[e]quality under the law shall not be denied or abridged
because of sex, race, color, or national origin. This amendment is self-operative.").
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. 744 S.W.2d at 218 (emphasis added).
118. Id.
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Amendment.' 19 The court held that the phrase "under the law" excluded
acts of "purely private discrimination" from coverage. 120 This conclusion
suggests a constitutional requirement for state action.12 1 The employees
filed an application for writ of error challenging the court's decision. 122 The
Texas Supreme Court originally granted writ of error on the issue whether
the Equal Rights Amendment prohibits private acts of sexual discrimination. 12 3 Later, the supreme court withdrew its order granting the applica12 4
tion for writ of error and denied the writ.

In Jones v. Memorial Hospital System, 125 a freedom of speech case, the
court of appeals reversed a summary judgment granted in favor of the hospi-

tal because the court found an issue of fact whether the hospital was a private employer or "an entity so involved with government as to be
functioning as a public entity."' 26 The court specifically left unresolved the
issue whether or not article I, section 8 of the Texas Constitution provides a
cause of action against private entities for alleged freedom of speech violations.1 27 This constitutional prohibition may therefore only apply to public
entities.
In Jones the employee, a registered nurse, wrote an article that was published in a local newspaper. The article discussed "the conflict between the
duty of hospital personnel to prolong life and the right of terminally ill patients to die with dignity."' 128 After publication of the article the hospital
discharged Jones. Subsequently, she filed a lawsuit against the hospital for
infringing on her right to freedom of speech under article I, section 8 of the
Texas Constitution. 129 Th6 trial court 130 granted the hospital's motion for
119. Id. at 219.
120. Id. (relying upon In re Unnamed Baby McClean, 725 S.W.2d 696, 697 (Tex. 1987);
Lincoln v. Mid-Cities Pee Wee Football Ass'n, 576 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1979, no writ), and Junior Football Ass'n of Orange v. Gaudet, 546 S.W.2d 70, 71 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ).
121. See Junior Football Ass'n of Orange v. Gaudet, 546 S.W.2d at 70 ("under the law"
requires state action or private conduct that was encouraged or closely related in function with
state action). In Cedillo there was no fact issue raised whether the conduct in question was
purely private. 744 S.W.2d at 219.
122. 756 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. 1988).
123. Cedillo v. Ewlin Enter., Inc., 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 601 (July 13, 1988).
124. Cedillo v. Ewlin Enter., Inc., 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 636 (Sept. 14, 1988).
125. 746 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
126. Id. at 894, 897.
127. Id. at 894.
128. Id. at 892.
129. Id. at 893. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8 provides:
Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on any
subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be
passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press. In prosecutions for the
publication of papers, investigating the conduct of officers, or men in public capacity, or when the matter published is proper for public information, the truth
thereof may be given in evidence. And in all indictments for libels, the jury shall
have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the
court, as in other cases.
130. The trial judge was the Honorable Thomas R. Phillips, now the Chief Justice of the
Texas Supreme Court.
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1 31
summary judgment because the employee failed to state a cause of action.
The court of appeals reversed.
First, the court held that "article I, section 8 of the Texas Constitution
constitutes an independent legal basis for a cause of action claiming an infringement of the right of free speech". 132 The court observed that the free
speech amendment under the Texas Constitution, unlike the federal constitution, affirmatively guarantees that all persons have the right to speak,
write, or publish their opinion on any subject. 13 3 The federal constitution,
by contrast, merely proscribes governmental curtailment of such
freedoms. 134
Second, the court held that a private entity that functions as a public entity is liable for any violation of article I, section 8 of the Texas Constitution.' 35 The court rejected the federal tests adopted for determining state
and adopted a test that "required a, lower threshold of public activaction
ity."'1 36 The test enunciated by the court was whether the private entity (hospital) "was so substantially involved with state and federal activity, that its
actions should be treated as those of a public entity for the purposes of con38
stitutional adjudication." 137 Applying the test to a laundry list of factors,'
the court observed that the determination of whether the private hospital
actually functioned as a government institution presented a mixed question
of law and fact.139 Accordingly, the court found that the hospital had not
satisfied its burden of proof.'"'

2. Claims Under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act
In Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co.141 Levi Strauss discharged Abston and
Abston sued for violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act. 142 Abston also asserted state law claims for breach of employment contract and for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.' 43 In
131. 746 S.W.2d at 893. In the first summary judgment proceeding, Judge Phillips also
held that the employee could not recover on her cause of action. Id. at 892. On appeal, the
court reversed because the hospital had not conclusively established that "[it] was not a 'public
entity' such as would preclude the plaintiff [employee] from first amendment protection under
the so-called 'state action' doctrine." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Jones v. Memorial
Hosp. Sys., 677 S.W.2d 221, 226 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ)).

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 893-94.
Id. at 893.
Id.
Id. at 894.
Id. at 894-95.
Id. at 895.
Id. at 894-95. The court applied the test to eleven factors. Id. (citing Annotation,

Action of PrivateHospital as State Action Under 42 USCS § 1983 or FourteenthAmendment, 42

A.L.R. FED. 463, 472-533 (1979)).
139. Id. The court also noted that "the ultimate determination of the issue [would] turn
largely on circumstantial evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom." Id. at 897. Thus, the
court suggested that "such a determination may best be accomplished after full development of

all relevant facts and law in a traditional trial." Id.
140. Id. at 896.
141. 684 F. Supp. 152 (E.D. Tex. 1987).
142. Id. at 153.
143. Id.
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its motion for summary judgment Levi Strauss argued that the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) 144 creates the only remedy for
barring any
claims of employment discrimination under Texas law, thereby
14 5
common law claims based upon employment discrimination.
The district court disagreed and denied the motion for summary judgment
for four reasons. First, the language of the TCHRA 146 indicates an optional,
rather than exclusive, remedy. 147 The court observed that the permissive
language would be inconsistent with a legislative intent that the TCHRA
preempt common law causes of action. 148 Second, the TCHRA acknowledges the possibility of other claims by prohibiting the initiation of a complaint if another action is already pending. 149 Third, if the Commission does
not act positively on an employment discrimination complaint within a de0
fined time interval, the TCHRA allows the complainant to file a lawsuit. 15
Finally, the TCHRA provides that it "shall be construed accordingly to the

fair import of its terms."' 151 The court thus concluded that, read as a whole,
the TCHRA is "an optional rather than a mandatory1 52vehicle for bringing
employment discrimination claims under Texas law."'
In a case pending appeal' 53 a jury recently awarded a female employee,
Mary Dean, $337,600 in damages against her employer, Syndex Corporation, and her supervisor, jointly and severally, for alleged sexual harassment
in violation of the TCHRA, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.154 Dean alleged numerous acts of sexual harassment

155

and acts of

144. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1989).
145. Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co., 684 F. Supp. at 155.
146. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 6.01(a) provides that "[a] person claiming
to be aggrieved by an unlawful employment practice, or that person's agent, may file with the
commission a complaint..." (emphasis added).
147. 684 F. Supp. at 155.

148. Id. at 156.
149. Id. (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, 6.01(f) (Vernon 1987)). Section
6.01(f) provides:
No person who has initiated any action in a court of competent jurisdiction or
who has an action pending before any administrative agency under any other
law or any local ordinance . . . based on an act that would be an unlawful
employment practice under this article may file a complaint under this section

with respect to the same grievance.
150. 684 F. Supp at 156 (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 7.01(a) (Vernon
1987)).
151. Id. (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 1.03 (Vernon 1987)).
152. Id.
153. Dean v. Bushell, No. 376,624 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 147th Judicial Dist. of
Texas, Jan. 8, 1988). As of this writing, the appeal has been perfected and has been assigned
case No. 03-88-090-CV in the Austin Court of Appeals.
154. Id.
155. Id. Dean specifically alleged the following acts of sexual harassment: (1) repeatedly
professing his love for Dean; (2) frequently talking about his own domestic sexual problems
and sexual fantasies with Dean; (3) following Dean about the office; (4) indicating that he
wanted to have an affair with Dean; (5) coming out of his office in a state of undress when he
knew or should have known Dean would be present; (6) telling Dean about his desire to have
an affair; (7) letting it be known that he wanted to purchase a couch that he could use with
Dean; (8) making comments about Dean's body and her clothes; and (9) treating Dean exceedingly nicely and then changing his manner of behavior toward her after she publicly refused his
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assault.' 56 Dean also alleged that Syndex Corporation through its corporate
vice-president knew of her supervisor's conduct and negligently failed to inquire about it or to prevent the reoccurrence of the conduct. 157 Dean
claimed that her supervisor's conduct occurred in the course and scope of
his employment. 158 Although the employer knew or should have known of
the sexually offensive atmosphere it took no corrective action. Dean thus
sought lost wages and benefits, compensatory damages for physical pain and
5 9
mental distress, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation costs.'

The jury awarded Dean: $5,600 as damages for the assault (jointly and severally against her supervisor and Syndex); $70,000 as damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress and resulting medical costs (jointly and

severally against her supervisor and Syndex); $20,000 exemplary damages
for the assault (against Syndex); $30,000 exemplary damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress (against Syndex); $50,000 for lost
wages (against Syndex); $20,000 for future wages (against Syndex); $123,000
in attorney's fees (against Syndex); and litigation costs (jointly and severally
against her supervisor and Syndex).1 60
3.

Claims Under the Texas Employment Commission

Upon an employee's termination of employment, the employee will oftentimes seek unemployment compensation benefits from the Texas Employment Commission (TEC). 16 1 Generally, when an employer challenges a
former employee's eligibility to receive unemployment compensation benefits, the employer will allege that he or she discharged the former employee
because of "misconduct."'' 62 As defined in article 5221b, misconduct in-

cludes mismanagement, neglect, intentional wrongdoing, or violation of a
work rule.' 63 Parties frequently litigate the employee's violation of an emadvances, including adding additional responsibilities to her already extensive work load.
Dean also alleged acts of assault. (See infra note 156).
156. Id. Dean specifically alleged the following acts of assault: (1) her supervisor grabbed
her and tried to kiss her; (2) grabbed her about her waist and breast area, (3) rubbed her
shoulders; (4) grabbed her by her arms; and (5) frequently touched or attempted to touch her.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.

160. Id.
161. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b (Vernon 1987).
162. A person fails to qualify for unemployment compensation benefits if "he has been
discharged for misconduct connected with his last work." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
522lb-3(b) (Vernon 1987). Recently, in Beaumont v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 753
S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1988, writ denied), the court affirmed the
TEC's decision that an employee who gave premature notice of her job termination was ineligible to receive unemployment benefits.
163. The provisions of article 5221b-17(q) define misconduct as:
mismanagement of a position of employment by action or inaction, neglect that
places in jeopardy the lives or property of others, intentional wrongdoing, or
malfeasance, intentional violation of a law, or violation of a policy or rule
adopted to ensure orderly work and the safety of employees, but does not include an act of misconduct that is in response to an unconscionable act of an
employer or superior.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b-17(q) (Vernon 1987).
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ployer's policy or rule as a basis for claiming misconduct. 164
In Mercer v. Ross' 6 5 the employer discharged Mercer from her employment as a travel agent, because she made numerous errors including incorrectly booking and preparing tickets with the wrong names and destinations
and distributing premature airline schedules, which ultimately caused her
employer to lose a large commercial account. Mercer, thereafter, sought
employment compensation. The employer alleged that Mercer's misconduct
disqualified her from compensation. The TEC awarded Mercer unemployment benefits and the employer appealed. 166 The trial court and court of
appeals reversed the TEC's decision.1 67 The supreme court upon review' 68
held that mismanagement does not constitute misconduct in the absence of
intent or such a degree of carelessness, whether manifested through action or
inaction, as to evidence a disregard of the consequences.' 69 The court observed that the legislature did not intend that an inability to perform duties
required disqualification from benefits.' 70 The court recognized that any
employee who performs unsatisfactorily, lowers profits and, to the extent of
time and materials needed to correct mistakes, the employee jeopardizes
either the employer's or customer's property.'71 The court concluded, however, that the statute did not disqualify a claimant merely because he caused
his employer inconvenience or additional costs. 172 The employer did not
present evidence that Mercer intentionally mismanaged her duties, or that
she placed the lives or property of others in jeopardy. The supreme court,
173
therefore, reinstated the TEC's award of benefits.
164. See Mercer v. Ross, 701 S.W.2d 830, 839 (Tex. 1986) (employer claiming inability to
perform duties satisfactorily as the employee's misconduct); see also Texas Employment

Comm'n v. Hughes Drilling Fluids, 746 S.W.2d 796, 797 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988), writ

granted, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 643, 643 (Sept. 14, 1988) (policy providing for urinalysis connected

with drug testing); Burton v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 743 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex. App.El Paso 1987, writ denied) (rule demanding employee make complaints to immediate supervisor); Lairson v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 742 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1987, no writ) (company attendance policy requiring notice of being late or absent); Haas v.
Texas Employment Comm'n, 683 S.W.2d 462, 463 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ) (store
policy requiring identification before the selling of alcohol).
165. 701 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. 1986).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. A review of the TEC's decision requires a trial de novo with substantial evidence
review. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 522lb-4(i) (Vernon Supp. 1989); Mercer v. Ross, 701
S.W.2d at 831.
169. 701 S.W.2d at 831.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. Compare id. with Haas v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 683 S.W.2d 462 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1984, no writ), where E. G. Haas, an employee of a liquor store, was discharged

for selling beer to minors and charging customers less than the retail price for beer and wine.
The TEC denied Haas unemployment benefits and he appealed. Haas argued that misconduct
must be "wanton, willful or deliberate." Affirming the TEC's denial of unemployment benefits, the court disagreed and concluded that Haas's sale of liquor to minors violated a policy or

rule adopted to ensure orderly work and jeopardized the property of others. The store, for
example, could possibly lose its liquor license. Further, Haas's sale of liquor at a reduced price
"constituted misconduct because it was mismanagement of his position as a clerk if" his con-

duct was intentional, and neglect if unintentional. Id. at 465.
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Texas Employment Commission v. Hughes Drilling Fluids,174 pending
before the supreme court, involves the question of whether the failure to
submit a urine sample for drug screening purposes, as required by company
policy, constitutes misconduct. 175 The employee without doubt violated the
company policy, thus, the supreme court faces the issue of whether the employer implemented a reasonable drug screening policy. 176 Authority exists
for the proposition, as discussed below, that an employer's policy or rule
must represent a reasonable rule before a violation of such may constitute
misconduct. 177 If the supreme court finds that the substantial evidence standard of review supports the TEC's decision concerning the unreasonableness
of the drug screening policy, then apparently the refusal to participate in
drug screening tests will not constitute misconduct.
In Burton v. Texas Employment Commission 178 Burton, employed as a
cake decorator for Albertson's, received instructions to report complaints to
her immediate supervisor. When Burton's complaints to her supervisor
about stale sale items remaining on the racks proved fruitless, Burton complained to the store manager. Burton received a reprimand as a result of
failing to make the complaint to her immediate supervisor. After becoming
disruptive, Burton refused to sign the written reprimand. The employer
fired Burton. The TEC denied Burton's claim for benefits, because her employer discharged her for insubordination based upon misconduct connected
with her work. 179 The trial court and court of appeals affirmed the decision
of the TEC.180 The court, without clarification, simply found that Burton's
conduct fell within the meaning of misconduct as defined in the statute.' 8'
In Lairson v. Texas Employment Commission 182 the employer discharged
Lairson, a quality control inspector, for violating a company attendance policy. "The policy provided that an employee who failed on two separate occasions to inform his supervisor within two hours of his scheduled starting
time that he would be absent or late could be terminated."' 183 Lairson had
violated the rule once, and on the second occasion Lairson's truck had broken down while driving to work. Lairson lost his job because instead of
contacting his employer, he tried to repair his truck and failed to meet the
two hour deadline. The TEC denied Lairson's claim for benefits because
84
Lairson's discharge resulted from misconduct.1
Lairson argued on appeal that misconduct required a showing of intent
174. 746 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988), writ granted, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 643 (Sept.
14, 1988).

175. See infra text accompanying and notes 297-307 for a full discussion of the decision.
176. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 643.
177. See Lairson v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 742 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1987, no writ) (company rule must be reasonable in order for violation of rule to constitute misconduct).
178. 743 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ denied).
179. Id. at 691.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 693.
182. 742 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
183. Id. at 100. The policy was proposed to the company by the Teamsters Union in 1983.
184. Id.
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and that the employer had implemented an unreasonable policy. 185 The
1 86
court disagreed and held that misconduct does not always require intent.
Citing Mercer v. Ross, the court observed that while mismanagement requires intent, mismanagement represents only one of the statutorily prohibited acts constituting misconduct. 187 The court declined to require intent for
the violation of a company rule as a measure of misconduct where in fact the
statute does not require such a rule. 18 8 The court agreed with Lairson's second argument that a reasonable rule must exist in order for violation of a
company rule to constitute misconduct. 189 Lairson, however, failed to affirmatively demonstrate the unreasonableness of the attendance policy.' 90
4. Article 8307c Retaliatory Discharge Claims
Since the Texas Supreme Court held that the National Labor Relations
Act does not preempt article 8307c claims' 9 1 and that article 8307c provides
punitive damages for retaliatory discharges, 92 the lower courts have continued to expand the scope of the Workers' Compensation Act.' 93 In WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Kee 194 the court of appeals upheld a jury's award of
punitive damages under article 8307c, which represented approximately six
times the actual damages award.195 In Kee the employee's hospitalization
resulted from an on-the-job back injury. During her hospitalization and recuperation, Kee's personnel manager spoke with her several times to wish
her well and to urge her to return to work as soon as possible. While recuperating, Kee filed a workers' compensation claim, which she ultimately settled. Kee returned to Wal-Mart with a full release six days later, but the
personnel manager fired her.
Wal-Mart, on appeal, challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the jury's award of punitive damages and complained that the court awarded
excessive punitive damages. 196 Wal-Mart argued that "the 'absence of a history of confrontation' between the parties, 'the absence of abusive language'
and the 'limited time period' of the alleged malice" should be considered in
weighing the evidence of malice. 197 Rejecting Wal-Mart's challenge, the
court observed that "there had been no previous complaints" concerning
185. Id. at 100-01.
186. Id. at 101.

187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Ruiz v. Miller Curtain Co., 702 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. 1985) (art. 8307c of the Workers' Compensation Act is not preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (1982)).
192. Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 734 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex. 1987) (punitive damages may be
recovered under art. 8307c of the Workers' Compensation Act).
193. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Kee, 743 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, no writ);
General Elec. Co. v. Kunze, 747 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, writ denied).
194. 743 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, no writ).
195. Id. The court awarded actual damages of $4,500 and punitive damages of $25,000.
196. Id. at 297-98.
197. Id. at 298.
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Kee's performance, and that the "dramatic change in outlook" was most
"reasonably attributed to animus arising out of the workers' compensation
settlement."'198 Based upon the factors for reviewing an award of punitive
damages, 199 the court concluded that the punitive damages award, approximately six times the actual damages, "was not so large to justify a conclusion
that it was the result of passion, prejudice or a disregard of the evidence." 2°°
The court affirmed the jury's actual and punitive damages award. 20
In GeneralElectric Co. v. Kunze 20 2 the court of appeals held that an employee who is discharged in violation of article 8307c may recover lost future
wages. 20 3 In Kunze the jury awarded Kunze $100,000 for lost past wages,
$195,000 for lost future wages, $53,800 for lost past retirement and other
benefits, $50,000 for future lost retirement benefits, and $120,000 for punitive damages. 2° 4 Kunze's expert testified that Kunze had a fifteen-year
work-life expectancy, and the projected lost future wages and future benefits
resulted from this work-life expectancy. General Electric argued on appeal
that, as a matter of law, article 8307c required Kunze to initially seek reinstatement and the evidence did not establish that reinstatement would not
have represented an appropriate remedy. Relying upon the supreme court's
opinion in Carnation Co. v. Borner,20 5 the court of appeals rejected General
Electric's argument and held that article 8307c did not restrict the elements
of recoverable damages. 20 6 The court also observed that General Electric
willfully and maliciously discharged Kunze in violation of article 8307c and
that, as a result, sufficient evidence established the impracticability of
207
reinstatement.

II.

ENFORCEABILITY OF NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS

Since the supreme court's decision in Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc.,208 the
20 9
assault on noncompetition agreements has increased dramatically.
Whether an enforceable noncompetition agreement exists is a question of
198. Id. Kee settled her compensation claim for a lump sum of $7,500 and for one year of
free medical attention. Id. at 297.
199. Id. at 298 (citing Alamo Nat'l Bank v. Kraus, 616 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. 1981)).
200. Id. at 299.
201. Id.
202. 747 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, writ denied).
203. Id. at 831 (citing Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980)). In Carnation
one issue before the court involved whether future damages were recoverable under art. 8307c.
610 S.W.2d at 454. The court held that under art. 8307c "reasonable certainty as to the
amount of damages is required," and therefore "loss of wages in the future, retirement and
other benefits which are ascertainable with reasonable certainty and are the result of wrongful
discharge" are recoverable. Id.
204. 747 S.W.2d at 828.
205. 610 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980).
206. 747 S.W.2d at 831.
207. Id. at 832.
208. 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987).
209. See also White, "Common Callings" and the Enforcement of Postemployment Covenants in Texas, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 589 (1988) [hereinafter Common Callings] (discussing
concept and enforceability of postemployment noncompetition covenants).
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law for the court. 210 Surprisingly, in about one-half of the noncompetition
agreement cases that have reached the appellate courts since Hill, the courts
have held the agreements enforceable. Nevertheless, employers have encountered difficulty in drafting noncompetition agreements or covenants not
to compete that will withstand the Hill criteria.
Under Hill, a covenant not to compete must meet four broad requirements to represent a reasonable covenant: (1) the covenant must be necessary for the protection of the employer, i.e., the employer must have a
legitimate interest in protecting business goodwill or trade secrets; (2) the
covenant must not be oppressive to the employee in that limitations as to
time, territory, and activity must be reasonable; (3) the covenant must not be
injurious to the public by preventing competition or by depriving the community of needed goods; and (4) the employer gives consideration for something of value, i.e., the imparting of special training or knowledge to the
employee. 21' A covenant is also unenforceable if its purpose limits competition or it restrains the right to engage in a common calling. 21 2 The supreme
court recently reinforced its restriction on the enforceability of noncompetipolicy in Texas promotes
tion agreements by stating that the fundamental
21 3
free movement of workers in the job market.
A. Texas Supreme Court Decisions
In DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp.214 the supreme court applied the Hill
criteria to find a covenant not to compete unreasonable. 21 5 In the case, DeSantis, a specialist in security, had accepted a managerial position and signed
a noncompetition agreement with Wackenhut Corporation. 21 6 Florida law
governed the covenant not to compete, and it covered forty counties. 21 7 After two years, DeSantis resigned his employment. DeSantis then formed a
new company, Risk Deterrence, Inc. (RDI), which provided security consultant and security guard services. Several Wackenhut customers became
clients of RDI after DeSantis notified them of his new venture. Wackenhut
sued DeSantis and RDI for injunctive relief and monetary damages claiming
breach of the noncompetition agreement and tortious interference with contract and business relations. DeSantis and RDI counterclaimed alleging
fraud and tortious interference with contract. 2 18 Following a jury trial, the
trial court enjoined DeSantis from competing with Wackenhut for two years
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Henshaw v. Kroenecke, 656 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tex. 1983).
725 S.W.2d at 170-71.
Id. at 172.
DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 616, 620 (July 13, 1988).
Id.

215. Id.
216. Wackenhut Corporation specialized in furnishing security guards to businesses. DeSantis was assigned as manager of the Houston office.
217. The noncompetition agreement provided that any questions concerning interpretation
or enforcement of this contract shall be governed by Florida law. Id. at 616-17.

218. The defendants also sought money damages for wrongful issuance of a temporary
injunction and under the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act. Id. at 617 (citing TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01. (Vernon 1989)).
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after modifying the noncompetition agreement to encompass
only thirteen
220
counties. 21 9 The trial court denied DeSantis' counterclaims.
The supreme court declined to apply Florida law to the noncompetition
agreement because application contravened the public policy of Texas. 22 1
The court observed that covenants not to compete are "among those matters
that embody 'fundamental policies.' ",222 Finding that Florida recognizes
that covenants not to compete are enforceable, 223 and that Texas law sets
multiple restrictions on such covenants, 224 the court concluded that "enforcement of Florida law would be contrary to the fundamental Texas public
policy of promoting free movement of workers in the job market. ' 225 The
court, therefore, disregarded the choice of law clause and reviewed the enforceability of the noncompetition agreement under Texas law.
The court, in determining whether the agreement was enforceable, found
that DeSantis was not engaged in a common calling based upon the extent of
his responsibilities. 226 Applying the Hill criteria, the court further found
that an unreasonable covenant existed because Wackenhut did not need the
protection of the covenant and Wackenhut had not given any consideration
for the agreement. 227 The unreasonableness of the covenant resulted in set228
ting aside the injunction.
The DeSantis court then reviewed the denial of the counterclaims brought
by DeSantis and RDI based upon wrongful issuance of the injunction and
violation of the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act. 229 On the issue of
wrongful issuance of the injunction, the jury found that $18,000 would compensate RDI for the loss of net profits caused by the enforcement of the
219. DeSantis, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 617. DeSantis also was prevented from disclosing
client lists or confidential information. In addition, RDI was permanently enjoined from using
confidential information acquired through DeSantis pertaining to Wackenhut. RDI also could
not employ DeSantis for a two-year period in a capacity that would compete with Wackenhut.

Id.
220. Id. The trial court granted Wackenhut's motion for summary judgment on the claim
for tortious interference, a directed verdict on the fraud claim, and judgment non obstante
verdicto on the claims for money damages.
221. Id. at 618.
222. Id. at 619.
223. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 542.33 (1988)).
224. Id. (citing Bergman v. Norris of Houston, 734 S.W.2d 673, 674 (Tex. 1987); Hill v.
Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168, 172 (Tex. 1987)).
225. Id. at 620.
226. Id. Although DeSantis was a professional in the security business, his responsibilities
as office manager only entailed handling gross revenues, operations, contracts, proposals and
clientele development.
227. Id. With respect to the first Hill requirement, the court observed that Wackenhut
would not suffer irreparable harm as a result of DeSantis' breach of the covenant. Under the
Hill requirement of consideration, the court found no evidence that DeSantis obtained any
special knowledge or training from Wackenhut. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. The supreme court found that the counterclaim for tortious interference with

contract was not preserved for appellate review, and that the court of appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's directed verdict in favor of Wackenhut on the fraud counterclaim. Id.
at 621.
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noncompetition agreement. 230 The court allowed RDI to recover its actual
damages for wrongful issuance of the injunction based upon an unenforceable noncompetition agreement. 231 The court then reviewed the issue of the
violation of the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act and observed that
under the statute "a person whose business or property has been injured by a
contract in restraint of trade or commerce may bring suit to recover actual
damages, prejudgment interest, costs and attorney's fees."' 232 Based upon
the unreasonableness of the noncompetition agreement, the court concluded
that the covenant restrained trade and violated the statute. 2 33 RDI could
234
accordingly recover those damages allowed by the statute.
In a case decided on the same day as DeSantis, the supreme court held
another noncompetition agreement void in Martin v. Credit ProtectionAssociation, Inc.23 5 Martin, a salesman, signed a noncompetition agreement in
which he agreed, for a period of three years following his termination of
employment, not to sell, solicit, or contact customers of Credit Protection
Association (CPA). Subsequently, Martin quit and started his own collection service. The trial court enforced the agreement and the court of appeals

affirmed.

236

After reiterating the Hill criteria, the supreme court noted "two instances
when covenants not to compete will be upheld: (1) covenants incident to the
sale of a business; and (2) post-employment covenants to prevent utilizing
special training or knowledge. '23 7 First, the court found that CPA's interest
in protecting "customer information" represented neither specialized training nor knowledge. 238 Second, the court held that Martin, a salesman, was
engaged in "a 'common calling occupation'," which would not be re240
strained. 239 The supreme court therefore held the covenant void.
B.

What is a Common Calling?

In Hill Justice Gonzalez criticized the court for failing to adopt a definition of "common calling."' 24 1 The court of appeals reviewed the definition of
this term in Travel Masters, Inc. v. Star Tours, Inc. 24 2 Breaking the phrase
230. Id. at 620. The jury found that De Santis had suffered zero damages from the injunction. Id.
231. Id. at 620-21.
232. Id. at 621 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.21(a)(l) (Vernon 1989)). If the
conduct is willful or flagrant, treble damages may be awarded. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 15.21(a)(1) (Vernon 1987).

233. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 621.

234. Id.

235. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 626 (July 13, 1988).

236. Id.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. (citing Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Tex. 1987)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168, 177 (Tex. 1987) (Gonzalez, J., dis-

senting, joined by Hill, C.J., and Campbell, J.).

242. 742 S.W.2d 837, 840-41 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ dism'd w.o.j.). See also Common Callings, supra note 209, at 612-15 (commenting that common law use of "common calling" serves no guide to Texas courts in covenant not to compete cases).
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apart, "common" was defined as something "quite usual and average, entirely ordinary and undistinguished;" and "calling" was defined as "the activity in which one customarily engages as a vocation or profession. ' 243 The
court therefore defined "common calling" as "a 'vocation or profession of
the usual type' which is 'entirely ordinary and undistinguished.' 244 Relying on Travel Masters, another court stated that a person engaged in a common calling is "one who performs a generic task for a living, one that
changes little no matter for whom or where an employee works. ' 245
Since Hill, courts have held that barbers 24 6 and salesmen 247 are workers
engaged in common callings. In one case, the court of appeals appeared to
suggest, over a strong dissent, that the practice of ear, nose and throat
medicine is a common calling. 248 That the majority intended to classify such
a medical specialty as a common calling seems doubtful. The courts have
found, in addition, that a professional office manager in the security business, 2 4 9 an office manager, 250 a manager of retail operations for a gas company, 251 and a licensed certified public accountant are individuals who are
252
not engaged in a common calling.
C.

Court of Appeals Decisions

During the past year, the courts of appeals have reviewed the validity of
noncompetition agreements in eleven cases. 253 In upholding the validity of
such agreements in five cases, the courts found that each covenant not to
compete was reasonable and enforceable under the four-part Hill analysis. 254
The courts also held noncompetition agreements enforceable in two cases
because they were incident to the sale of a business. 255 In four cases, how243. 742 S.W.2d at 840-41 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 458
(3d ed. 1981)).
244. Id. at 841.
245. B. Cantrell Oil Co. v. Hino Gas Sales, Inc., 756 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1988, no writ).
246. Bergman v. Norris of Houston, 734 S.W.2d 673, 674 (Tex. 1987).
247. Martin v. Credit Protection Ass'n, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 626, 626 (July 13, 1988).
248. Hoddeson v. Conroe Ear, Nose and Throat Associates, 751 S.W.2d 289, 290 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1988, no writ) (Brookshire, J., dissenting).
249. DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 616, 620 (July 13, 1988).
250. Travel Masters, Inc. v. Star Tours, Inc., 742 S.W.2d 837, 841 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1987, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
251. B. Cantrell Oil Co. v. Hino Gas Sales, Inc., 756 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1988, no writ).
252. Bland v. Henry & Peters, 763 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, no writ).
253. See infra notes 254, 255 and 256 for a list of the cases.
254. B. Cantrell Oil Co. v. Hino Gas Sales, Inc., 756 S.W.2d 781, 784 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1988, no writ); Bertotti v. C.E. Shepherd Co., Inc., 752 S.W.2d 648, 655 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ); Travel Masters, Inc. v. Star Tours, Inc., 742 S.W.2d 837,
840 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Unitel Corp. v. Decker, 731 S.W.2d 636, 640
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ); Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Associates, Inc., 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 17, 18 (Oct. 12, 1988) (court of appeals' opinion finding noncompetition agreement reasonable).
255. M.R.S. Datascope, Inc. v. Exchange Data Corp., 745 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Tex. App.Houston [Ist Dist.] 1988, no writ); Chandler v. Mastercraft Dental Corp., 739 S.W.2d 460, 464
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ denied).
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ever, the courts found the noncompetition agreements unenforceable. 256
1. Noncompetition Agreements Held Enforceable
In Bertotti v. C. E. Shepherd Co. 257 the employer represented a manufacturer and seller of wire and plastic products. Shepherd hired Bertotti as a
sales manager. As a condition of his employment, Bertotti signed an agreement promising not to disclose trade secrets or confidential information and
agreeing not to compete with Shepherd for two years following termination
of his employment. Ultimately, Shepherd discharged Bertotti, and Bertotti
began competing with Shepherd. 258 Shepherd sued Bertotti for breach of the
agreement and injunctive relief. The trial court granted a temporary injunc25 9
tion, and Bertotti appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed and found the covenant reasonable under
the Hill criteria. 260 First, the court found that Shepherd's information regarding its product qualified as trade secrets and that Shepherd had a legitimate interest in protecting the information. 26' Second, the covenant was not
oppressive to Bertotti because he would not be deprived of his ability to
work due to his previous experience and education. 262 Third, the covenant
did not injure the public because at least five other companies competed with
Shepherd, which would not deprive the community of needed goods. 26 3 Finally, consideration supported the covenant in that Bertotti received special
264
training and knowledge.
In B. Cantrell Oil Co. v. Hino Gas Sales, Inc.265 Elezar Renteria worked
for Hino Gas under an employment agreement which provided that Renteria
would not compete against Hino Gas in Cameron County for eighteen
months after termination of employment. Renteria subsequently went to
work for Lone Star, a new company that planned to compete with Hino Gas.
Hino Gas obtained an injunction preventing Renteria from violating the
noncompetition agreement, and Lone Star appealed. 266 The court of appeals
256. Bland v. Henry & Peters, 763 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, no writ). Diversified
Human Resources Group, Inc. v. Levinson-Polakoff, 752 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1988, no writ); Hoddeson v. Conroe Ear, Nose & Throat Associates, 751 S.W.2d 289, 291
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, no writ); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Resurreccion, 740 S.W.2d
607, 610 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ). In Orkin the court, without addressing
whether the covenant not to compete was unreasonable, held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to grant injunctive relief against a former employee who went to work
for a competitor where the employee, a pest control inspector and salesman, did not receive
any extensive, unique, or confidential training. Id.
257. 752 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
258. Although Bertotti did not have prior experience with products marketed by Shepherd,
Bertotti possessed a graduate degree in mechanical engineering and experience with chemical
companies.
259. 752 S.W.2d at 650.
260. Id. at 655.
261. Id. at 651-54.
262. Id. at 654.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 655.
265. 756 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
266. Id. at 782.
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affirmed. 267 First, the court found that the covenant was necessary to protect Hino Gas because Renteria had intimate knowledge of Hino Gas's confidential operations. 26 8 Second, the court found that the scope of the
limitations in the covenant as to time and territory were not oppressive to
Renteria. 2 69 Third, noting evidence that the propane business had boomed
in Renteria's absence and that the price of gas had decreased, the court concluded that the covenant was not injurious to the public. 270 Finally, consideration supported the covenant as a result of Renteria's raise and share of
271
company profits.
In Travel Masters, Inc. v. Star Tours, Inc. 272 Star Tours sued to enjoin

Travel Masters and Donna Goldsmith, its former office manager and travel
agent, from soliciting named customers of Star Tours. The trial court
granted the injunction, and Travel Masters appealed. 27 3 The court of appeals affirmed. 274 First, the court found the covenant necessary to protect
Star Tours' goodwill and customer lists, which proved important to Star
Tours' success.

275

Second, the covenant was not oppressive because Gold-

smith could work as a travel agent anywhere; the only limitation involved
the inability to solicit Star Tours' clients for two years. 276 Third, the covenant did not contravene public policy because restricting Goldsmith from
soliciting a limited number of Star Tours' clients could not harm the pub277
lic.

Finally, Goldsmith's acceptance of employment and the training she

received as office manager constituted consideration for the covenant. 2 78
In Unitel Corp. v. Decker279 Unitel, which sold and serviced cellular car
phones and air time for cellular phones, sought injunctive relief against three
former employees who went to work for a competitor in violation of a noncompetition agreement. The trial court denied the injunction, and Unitel
appealed. 280 The court of appeals reversed and granted Unitel a temporary
injunction restraining the former employees from breaching the noncompetition agreement. 28 1 First, the covenant was necessary for the protection of
Unitel because of its unique and confidential training program and the confidential customer leads given to the employees. 2 82 Second, the court found
267. Id. at 783-84.
268. Id. at 783.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. The court also found that Renteria did not represent someone engaged in a common calling because Renteria's duties and responsibilities far exceeded Lone Star's characterization of his job as a "dispatcher." Id.
272. 742 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
273. Id. at 838.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 840.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 841. The court also found that the position of office manager did not constitute
a common calling. Id. at 840-41.
279. 731 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
280. Id. at 638.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 639-40.
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that the employees would not suffer undue hardship simply because of the
need to find temporary employment in another area of sales. 283 Third, the
covenant did not injure the public because it did not deprive the community
of needed goods. 284 Finally, consideration supported the covenant because
2 85
Unitel imparted special training to the employees.
2.

Noncompetition Agreements Held Unenforceable

In Bland v. Henry & Peters28 6 the court of appeals found the noncompetition agreement between an accountant and an accounting firm unenforceable
because consideration did not support the agreement. 28 7 The court concluded that the imparting by the employer to the employee of specialized
training or knowledge constitutes the only consideration that will support a
covenant not to compete. 288 Because the employee, Bland, came to Henry &
Peters with sufficient accounting experience to practice his profession, the
court concluded that Bland did not receive any special training or knowl289
edge from Henry & Peters.
In Diversified Human Resources Group, Inc. v. Levinson-Polakoff290 the
court of appeals found the noncompetition agreement between a job placement counselor and an employment agency oppressive on its face and injurious to the public. 291 The court determined that the covenant was
unreasonable because it attempted to prevent the employee from working
within a fifty-mile radius of any city in which the employer operated. 292 The
covenant effectively prevented the employee from working in Texas because
the employer operated throughout Texas. 29 3 In Hoddeson v. Conroe Ear,
Nose & Throat Associates294 the noncompetition agreement between a doctor
and an ear, nose and throat clinic was unenforceable because its sole purpose
was to protect the clinic from competition. 29 5 The court consequently found
283. Id. at 640.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. 763 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, no writ).
287. Id. at 8.
288. Id.; see Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Resurreccion, 740 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1987, no writ) (covenant not to compete held unenforceable because pest control inspector salesman not provided with "extensive, unique and confidential training"). But see
Unitel Corp. v. Decker, 731 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ)
(special training acquired).
289. 763 S.W.2d at 8. The court strongly disagreed with the supreme court's repudiation
of the common law principles of consideration pertaining to the law of contracts. Id. Contrary to Bland, other courts have held that acceptance of employment or a raise in salary
constitutes sufficient consideration under Hill. See Bertotti, 752 S.W.2d at 655 (employment
acceptance constituted consideration); Travel Masters, Inc., 742 S.W.2d at 841 (acceptance of
employment met Hill requirement); B. Cantrell Oil Co., 756 S.W.2d at 783 (salary raise constituted consideration).
290. 752 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
291. Id. at 11.
292. Id. at 11-12.
293. Id. at 12.
294. 751 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, no writ).
295. Id. at 291.
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that enforcement of the agreement would not serve the public's interest. 296

III. DRUG TESTING AND PRIVACY RIGHTS
In Texas Employment Commission v. Hughes DrillingFluids2 9 7 the company discharged an employee, Bodessa, because he refused to sign a written
consent form and to submit a urine sample for a drug screening test as required by company policy. The Texas Employment Commission (TEC) initially denied Bodessa's claim for unemployment compensation. He then
appealed to the TEC Appeal Tribunal. The Tribunal reversed the determi298
nation and held that Bodessa qualified for unemployment compensation.
299
The TEC affirmed.
Hughes Drilling appealed to the county court seeking judicial review by a trial de novo. The county court granted summary
judgment to Hughes Drilling and reversed the TEC's determination, holding
that "misconduct" 3° ° disqualified Bodessa from receiving unemployment
compensation benefits. The TEC on appeal first argued that because Hughes
Drilling implemented the drug testing policy after Bodessa's employment
and continued to employ Bodessa with the knowledge that he had not signed
a written consent form, Hughes Drilling waived its right to enforce the policy against Bodessa. The Hughes Drilling court rejected this argument because, as an at will employee, Bodessa's conduct in continuing to work
constituted an acceptance of the terms of the drug testing policy. 30' Second,
the TEC argued that the policy was unreasonable in that it violated
Bodessa's fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures and invasion of privacy. Since the state interest called for eliminating drug abusers from the private sector workplace and evidence existed that
Bodessa consented to the drug screening process by continuing to work after
receiving notice of the provisions of the policy, the court held that the drug
testing policy did not violate Bodessa's fourth amendment rights. 30 2 Third,
the TEC argued that the drug testing policy violated Bodessa's common law
right to privacy. The court disagreed and held that because Bodessa impliedly consented to the drug screening process he forfeited "his 'right to be
296. Id. at 290-91. The agreement would have prevented Dr. Hoddeson from practicing in
his county for five years.
297. 746 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988), writ granted, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 643 (Sept.

14, 1988).
298. 746 S.W.2d at 797-98.
299. Id. at 798. In a recent similar case, the TEC took a contrary position. See Murrell v.
Dow Chemical Co., Comm'n App. No. 87-14601-10-081187 (Tex. Emp. Comm'n Nov. 10,
1987). In Murrell Gary Murrell, an employee for Dow Chemical, refused to submit to a random drug screening test. After Dow Chemical instituted the policy, Murrell protested but
continued to work for the company. The TEC observed that the purpose of the test was safety
because Dow Chemical manufactured chemicals. The TEC held that since Murrell "was
aware of the drug testing policy and knew that he could be chosen at random to be tested and
yet continued to work for [Dow Chemical], he accepted those conditions of employment and
his refusal to submit to the test was misconduct." Id. at 2.
300. See supra note 163 for the definition of misconduct as defined in the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act.
301. 746 S.W.2d at 799-800 (citing Hathaway v. General Mills, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 227, 228
(Tex. 1986)).
302. 746 S.W.2d at 801.
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left alone' while present in the workplace. '30 3
After acknowledging that a violation of unreasonable rules cannot constitute misconduct under the statute, the court reviewed the reasonableness of
the policy. 3°4 The court found that the objective of the policy was "to assist
in maintaining a safe working environment for employees. ' 30 5 The court
concluded that the policy was both reasonable and reasonably calculated to
ensure the safety of all employees. 30 6 The TEC appealed to the supreme
court, which has recently granted writ of error on the issue of whether
Bodessa's continued employment constituted consent to Hughes Drilling's
30 7
drug testing policy.
In Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc.30 8 Jennings, an at will employee, sued her employer to prevent the company from implementing a
urinalysis drug testing program to determine if the employees had recently
taken illegal drugs. The trial court found that Minco's drug testing policy
was lawful and enforceable. Jennings on appeal contended that the employment-at-will doctrine was inapplicable and that an employee's right to privacy should not be required to yield to the at will doctrine. The court of
appeals rejected Jennings' arguments and affirmed the trial court's
30 9
judgment.
The court, noting that either party to an at-will-employment contract may
modify the terms as a condition of continued employment, rejected Jennings'
argument that she may continue her employment without accepting the
the drug testing program. 310
modification of her employment terms, i.e.,
The court found that under the at will doctrine, Jennings could either accept
the new terms or quit, but that she could not compel performance of her at
will contract according to its terms at the date of her hire. 3 1' The court also
declined to accept Jennings' argument that her common law right of privacy
enlarged her at will contract rights and diminished those of her employer
because the importance of the right of privacy required that her at will contract be modified to effectuate that policy. 31 2 The court, noting the supreme
court's narrow exception to the at will doctrine in Sabine Pilot Service, Inc.
v. Hauck 3 13 and the importance of stare decisis, rejected Jennings' conten303. Id. at 802.
304. Id.
305. Id. The court found the drug testing was random and performed with concern for

each employee's privacy. Id.
306. Id.
307. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 643 (Sept. 14, 1988). The supreme court also granted writ of error
on the issue of whether the court of appeals correctly applied the substantial evidence standard

of review in reviewing the TEC's decision on the reasonableness of Hughes Drilling's drug
testing policy. Id.
308. 765 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ requested).

309. Id. at 498-99.
310. Id. at 499. (citing Hathaway v. General Mills, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. 1986)).

311. Id. at 502.
312. Id. The court also rejected Jennings' argument that the drug testing policy violated
her common law right of privacy. The urinalysis would only be conducted with Jennings'

consent, therefore, there would be no unlawful invasion of her privacy interest. Id.
313. 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985).
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tion that the court should create 14
a second exception to the at will doctrine
3
based upon the right of privacy.
IV.

STRIKES, PICKETING AND BoYcoTTs

In two companion cases, Howard Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal Aid,
Inc.31 5 and Nash v. Chandler3 16 the Fifth Circuit held several important provisions of the Texas mass picketing statutes unconstitutional.3 1 7 In Gault
the Texas Farm Workers Union (TFWU) attempted to organize onion harvest and packing shed workers in several counties during the 1980 onion
harvest. The TFWU began their organizing efforts knowing that the prospect of large monetary losses resulting from a harvest season strike would
pressure onion growers to accede to union demands. The TFWU sought
from the growers higher wages and better working conditions, as well as
union representation for the workers. The TFWU set up its first picket line
at one of the onion fields along the public road near the field being harvested.
The picketers talked to the workers as they arrived at work and handed
them leaflets. The picketers did not attempt to prevent workers from entering the field. The picketers did shout to the workers in the field and used a
loudspeaker urging them to strike. Although some picketers denounced
those workers who remained in the field, no threats or acts of violence took
place. As support for the strike increased, the TFWU established similar
picket lines at other onion fields, and nearly all of the workers eventually
left the onion fields. In response, several growers, packers, and trade associations sought a temporary restraining order in state district court alleging numerous violations of the Texas mass picketing statutes. The state
district court issued a temporary restraining order that restrained the picketers from violating the Texas mass picketing statutes. After removal of the
case to federal district court, the TFWU sought declaratory and injunctive
relief. The federal district court declared article 5154d, sections l(1), 2 and
3,318 article 5154f sections 2(b), 2(d) and 2(e),3 19 and article 5154g, section
2320 to be unconstitutional. 32 ' The Fifth Circuit affirmed that portion of the
federal district court's decision that held article 5154d, sections 1(1) and 3,
article 5154f sections 2(b) and 2(e) and article 5154g, section 2 to be unconstitutionally overbroad.3 22 The Fifth Circuit reversed in part the federal district court and held that article 5154d, section 2 and article 5154f, section
314. Jennings, 765 S.W.2d at 502.
315. 848 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1988).
316. 848 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1988).
317. In summary, the court held TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154d, §§ 1(1) and 3,
art. 5154f, §§ 1, 2(b) and 2(e), and art. 5154g, § 2 unconstitutional; and held id. art. 5154d,
§ 2, and art. 5154f, § 2(d) constitutional. See Howard Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal Aid,
Inc. 848 F.2d at 567; Nash v. Chandler, 848 F.2d at 569. Gault contains a more thorough
discussion of the constitutionality of the Texas mass picketing statutes. This discussion will
therefore focus on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Gault.
318. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5154d, §§ 1(1), 2, 3 (Vernon 1988).
319. Id. art. 5154f, §§ 2(b), 2(d), 2(e).
320. Id. art. 5154g § 2.
321. 615 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
322. Howard Gault Co., 848 F.2d at 567.
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2(d) are constitutional. 323 The Fifth Circuit's holding in Gault is summarized in the following chart:
Article 5154d, § 1(1), defines "mass
picketing," as follows:
[A]ny form of picketing . . . in
which:
There are more than two (2) pickets at any time within either fifty
(50 feet of any entrance to the
premises being picketed, or within
fifty (50) feet of any other picket
or pickets.

Article 5154d, § 2 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, singly or in concert with
others, by use of insulting, threatening or obscene language, to
interfere with, hinder, obstruct, or
intimidate, or seek to interfere
with, hinder, obstruct, or intimidate, another in the exercise of his
lawful right to work, or to enter
upon the performance of any lawful vocation, or from freely entering or leaving any premises.

Facts: Injunction prohibited the
farm workers from placing more
than two pickets within fifty (50) feet
of any entrance to the picketed
premises or within 50 feet of any
other picket.
Holding: The numbers-distance
formula was not narrowly tailored so
as to not infringe unduly on the first
amendment. Section 1 as it extends
to mass picketing was so broadly
written that it had a deterrent effect
on the exercise of First Amendment
324
rights.
Facts: Injunction prohibited the
farm workers from using insulting,
threatening, or obscene language to
interfere with or intimidate other
workers.
Holding: The Fifth Circuit held that
section 2 was not unconstitutionally
overbroad because the statute could
be construed to prohibit only "fight' 325
ing words.

323. Id.
324.

TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5154d,

325. 848 F.2d at 561.

§§ 1(1), 2, 3 (Vernon 1988).
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Article 5154d, § 3 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, singly or in concert with
others, to engage in picketing or
any form of picketing activities,
where any part of such picketing
is accompanied by slander, libel,
or the public display or publication of oral or written misre326
presentation.

Facts: Injunction prohibited the
farm workers from picketing, which
included slander, libel, or publication of oral or written misrepresentations.
Holding: The Fifth Circuit held that
the state cannot make it a criminal
offense to picket if a single picket
makes an oral misrepresentation
about anything at all, regardless of
its relevance to the strike or any
other matter of public concern.
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held
section 3 overbroad and unconstitutional under the First Amendment.

Article 5154f, § 1 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person
or persons, or association of persons, or any labor union, incorporated or unincorporated, or the
members or agents thereof, acting
singly or in concert with others, to
establish, call, participate in, aid
or abet a secondary strike, or secondary picketing, or a secondary
boycott, as those terms are defined
herein.

32 7

Facts: Injunction prohibited establishing or aiding a secondary
boycott.
Holding: The Fifth Circuit held that
section 1 was unconstitutional to the
extent it extended to secondary boycotts as defined in article 5154f, section 2(e). Further, section 1 was
unconstitutional to the extent it
extended to secondary picketing as
defined in article 5154f, section 2(d).
In reaching its decision, the Fifth
Circuit relied upon the Texas
Supreme Court's decisions in Int'l
Union of Operating Engineers v.
Cox, 148 Tex. 42, 219 S.W.2d 787
(1949) and Constr. and General
Labor Union v. Stephenson, 148
Tex. 434, 225 S.W.2d 958 (1950).328

326. Id. at 561-62.
327. Id. at 563-64.
328. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5154f, §§ 1, 2(b), 2(d), 2(e) (Vernon 1988).
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Article 5154f, § 2 provides:
b. "Secondary
strike"
shall
mean a temporary stoppage of
work by the concerted action of
two or more employees of an
employer where no labor dispute
exists between the employer and
such employees, and where such
temporary stoppage results from a
labor dispute to which such two
or more employees are not parties.

Facts: Injunction prohibited establishing or aiding a secondary
boycott.
Holding: The Fifth Circuit held that
in order to constitutionally prohibit
picketing, there must be an identifiable, legitimate, and specific state
policy. Because the statute did not
show that a specific policy existed,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that section 2(b) included within its proscription activity that the state could
not legitimately prohibit. Thus, section 2(b) was unconstitutionally
overbroad.

d. The term "secondary picketing" shall mean the act of establishing a picket or pickets at or
near the premises of any employer
where no labor dispute, as that
term is defined in this Act, exists
between such employer and his
employees.

329

Facts: Injunction prohibited establishing or aiding a secondary
boycott.
Holding: The Fifth Circuit held that
section 2(d) is constitutional. Relying upon Stephenson, the Fifth Circuit held that expanding the
definition of "labor dispute" to
include situations where the labor
union has a real and substantial
interest in the work taking place at a
picketing site, saved this portion of
the statute from constitutional infirmity.

329. 848 F.2d at 564.
330. Id. at 565-66.
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e. The term "secondary boycott" shall include any combination, plan, agreement or compact
entered into or any concerted
action by two or more persons to
cause injury or damage to any person, firm or corporation for whom
they are not employees, by
(1) Withholding patronage,
labor or other beneficial business intercourse from such
person, firm or corporation;
or
(2) Picketing such person, firm or corporation; or
(3) Refusing to handle,
install, use or work on the
equipment or supplies of such
person, firm or corporation;
or
(4) Instigating
or
fomenting a strike against
such person, firm or corporation; or
(5) Interfering with or
attempting to prevent the free
flow of commerce; or
(6) By
any
other
means causing or attempting
to cause an employer with
whom they have a labor dispute to inflict any damage or
injury to an employer who is
not a party to such labor dis3
pute. 31

331. Id. at 564-65.
332. Id. at 566.

Facts: Injunction prohibited establishing or aiding a scondary boycott.
Holding: The Fifth Circuit held that
section 2(e) was too broadly drawn
to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that
while a state may prohibit picketing
to prevent certain specific evils,
"damage or injury", no matter how
slight or subtle is too vague a pur332
pose.
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Article 5154g, §§ 1 and 2 provide:
1. It is hereby declared to be
the public policy of the State of
Texas that the right of persons to
work shall not be denied or
abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any
labor union or labor organization
and that in the exercise of such
rights all persons shall be free
from threats, force, intimidation
or coercion.

Facts: Injunction restrained Texas
Rural Legal Aid from encouraging
others to engage in any picketing,
boycott, or strike, or from engaging
in it themselves.

2. It shall be a violation of the
rights set forth in Section I for
any person or persons, or associations of persons, or any labor
union or labor organization, or the
members or agents thereof, acting
singly or in concert with others, to
establish, call, maintain, participate in, aid or abet any strike or
picketing, an object of which is to
urge, compel, force or coerce any
employer to recognize or bargain
with, or any employee or group of
employees to join or select as their
representative, any labor union or
labor organization which is not in
fact the representative of a majority of the employees of an
employer or, if the employer operates two or more separate and distinct places of business, is not in
fact the representative of a majority of such employees at the place
or places of business subjected to
334
such strike or picketing.

Facts: Injunction prohibited establishing or aiding any strike or picketing which urged, forced or coerced
an employer to bargain with a
minority union.
Holding: The Fifth Circuit observed
that section 2 goes beyond permissible restraints and prohibits picketing
to obtain an objective which is not
only lawful, but protected by the dictates of the First Amendment. Further, the Fifth Circuit observed that
it is not unlawful for employees to
join a minority union. Accordingly,
to the extent that section 2 prohibits
peaceful picketing to attain a lawful
objective, the Fifth Circuit held that
it was a constitutionally impermissible restraint.

V.

Holding: The Fifth Circuit observed
that a state may permissibly enjoin
peaceful picketing whose objective is
prohibited by state right to work
33 3
laws.

CONCLUSION

The development and implementation of employment standards and policies has historically and fundamentally been within the federal domain.
However, the rule of the federal government and the federal courts has not
been exclusive. State courts continue to address significant employment is333. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5154g, §§ 1, 2 (Vernon 1988).
334. 848 F.2d at 566-67.
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sues in both statutory and common law. As the contents of this Article
evidence, Texas courts still grapple with a variety of employment issues, including an increasing number of creative challenges to the principle of employment-at-will. These and other issues warrant an increased level of
attention by practitioners in Texas.

